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TiE HONORABLE PETER NEY,
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
EDWIN

S.

KAHN*

Judge Peter Ney's judicial opinions strike the reader much like complex renaissance paintings. In the background are the landscapes of the
times-the trees and rolling hills comparable to the general subject matter
of criminal law, local government, commercial transactions, and family
law. In the middle range lies the city, town, or specific building-much
like the facts of the case. And in the foreground is the specific subject of
the painting-a particular individual or group of persons-much like the
people and interests that come into play in a trial. When one views a series
of cases, like a series of paintings, common themes are visible. The grand
dominant theme in Judge Ney's opinions is that arbitrary governmental
action is properly and rightfully limited, and that, on those occasions
where individual liberties or powers are improperly limited, the individual
must prevail. A second related theme is that the rights of the less powerful
must be carefully protected by the law in operation.
Before turning to an examination of some particular cases, I would
like to tell you something ofJudge Ney's background. Peter Ney was born
in 1931 in Nuremberg, Germany. At the age of seven, due to Nazi intimidation of Jews, he emigrated to England without his parents, who were
required to stay in Germany for more than six months after he left. His
emigration was made possible by an English organization to rescue children endangered by the Nazis. He attended boarding school in England,
and in 1940, with his parents, emigrated again, this time to the United
States. His family settled in the Philadelphia area. He attended public
schools, and entered the Philadelphia College of Art. He obtained a bachelor of fine arts degree, majoring in product design. Thereafter, he
worked in industrial design.
After a two-year stint in the Army in the mid-1950s, he returned to the
field of industrial design. Russia's launching of Sputnik sparked his interest in work in the space program. In 1959, he joined the Martin Company
in Baltimore to work on human factors connected to space capsules. In
1960, he and his family moved to Denver, where he continued to work in
the field, becoming head of the department of human engineering at
Martin in 1965. Meanwhile, motivated by intellectual curiosity, in 1963 he
enrolled in night classes at the University of Denver Law School. He graduated in 1966.
* University of Colorado (BA cum laude 1958); Harvard Law School (L.LB. cum laude
1965); partner of Kelly, Haglund, Garnsey & Kahn; fellow of the American College of Trial
Lawyers; specialized in commercial litigation with an interest in constitutional litigation; former visiting lecturer at University of Colorado Law School (1985).
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After law school graduationJudge Ney opened a solo law office in the
Littleton-Englewood area, and in 1967 also worked part-time as an Arapahoe County deputy district attorney. He practiced solo for twenty-two
years, with most of his cases involving criminal defense, personal injury
law, and domestic relations. He handled numerous cases pro bono for the
American Civil Liberties Union, including the representation of University
of Denver students expelled for on-campus demonstrations, and also handled First Amendment cases challenging various obscenity statutes for
booksellers' associations and the Tattered Cover Bookstore. In a case with
echoes from his own youth, he successfully represented a Vietnamese
mother seeking the return of her four-year-old son from adopting parents
who had obtained the boy shortly after the fall of Saigon in 1972.
In 1988, after twenty-two years of solo practice, Judge Ney was appointed by Governor Roy Romer to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
Nine cases serve to illustrate both the range ofJudge Ney's work, and
the dominant theme of balancing individual rights against the coercive
power of government.
1.

Criminal Law Cases

In People v. Sprowi, the police obtained a court order for a wiretap,
and, as a result of information obtained therefrom, obtained arrest warrants for twenty-six individuals, including the defendant. When the police
officer appeared at defendant's residence, defendant agreed to speak to
the officer, but first excused himself and closed the doors to several
rooms. Defendant then returned to speak to the officer and closed the
front door behind him. The officer arrested the defendant and entered
the house to determine whether another person was inside. Once inside,
the police officer heard what he thought was a fan and a pump, the sound
emanating from the basement. The officer obtained a search warrant, and
found numerous marijuana plants and over twelve grams of cocaine.
On defendant's motion, the trial court ruled the evidence obtained
from the wiretap inadmissible, and also ruled the initial warrantless search
unlawful. The People appealed, and after certain other proceedings resulted in a conviction, the issue before the court of appeals was whether
the evidence obtained as a result of the search should be suppressed as the
illegal fruits of the initial entry.
In the court of appeals opinion, Judge Ney first carefully set out the
controlling standard, relying on Murray v. United States.2 "a search pursuant to a warrant cannot be considered an independent source of evidence
if the decision to obtain the warrant was prompted by observations made
during a prior illegal search, or if information... was presented to the
magistrate and affected his decision to issue the warrant."3
1. 790 P.2d 848 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
2. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
3. Sprow=4 790 P.2d at 850.
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Judge Ney then scrutinized in detail the affidavits supporting the warrant to see if the standard had been met. There simply was insufficient
information presented, apart from the tainted material, to support the
warrant, he concluded. The court determined the evidence was inadmissible and reversed the conviction. Judge Van Cise dissented with conclusory
remarks indicating that the untainted information, in his view, was sufficient. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
In People v. Smith,4 it was the right of confrontation that was at issue
rather than the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
There, three individuals were investigated for the shooting of a victim
sometime after an argument. Two co-defendants gave statements to the
police and ultimately pleaded guilty to second degree murder and received an agreed-upon sentence. Each refused to testify at the trial of the
third defendant, Smith. The trial court admitted portions of the co-defendants' statements, excising those portions where their statements disagreed with each other.
In the court of appeals opinion, Judge Ney, citing Lee v. Illinois,5
noted that under controlling United States Supreme Court standards, a
co-defendant's out-of-court statement is admissible if it bears sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome a presumption of untrustworthiness. He
also noted, however, that in Lee the defendant had made a statement of his
own to which the co-defendant's statement could be compared. Here,
there was no such statement and no such "interlock." Moreover, here the
co-defendants' statements were obtained only after they were told another
defendant had implicated them, and in an attempt to curry favor with the
police. In addition, material differences in the co-defendants' statements
supported the presumption that a co-defendant's statement is not trustworthy. Under these circumstances, the court reversed the conviction.
Judge Ruland dissented, pointing to specific factors he thought showed
the reliability of the statements. The Colorado Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
In People v. Auld,6 the Court was faced with an extraordinary situation
where a zealous prosecutor had filed a fictitious criminal complaint
against an imaginary defendant in order to determine whether a defense
lawyer was engaging in drug activity. The lawyer was charged with illegal
weapons dealing, and upon a motion to suppress, the trial court dismissed
the charges, citing "outrageous governmental misconduct." The court unequivocally rejected the district attorney's contentions that the dismissal
violated the separation of powers doctrine, that there was no prejudice to
the defendant, and that dismissal was too severe a sanction. In the opinion of the court, the prosecutor, by filing a false complaint, made the
4. 790 P.2d 862 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied 1990 Colo. LEXIS 291 (Colo. Apr.
23, 1990).
5. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
6. 815 P.2d 956 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 1991 Colo. App. LEXIS 12 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1163 (1992).
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court an unwitting accomplice for the prosecution. Once again, the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari.
2.

Other Governmental Activity

In People v. Buchol;,7 the court faced the difficult issue of whether the
government under the Care and Treatment Act may compel a person who
is expected to become gravely disabled without medication may be compelled to take medication before actually reaching that condition. Noting
that the statutory definition controlled, Judge Ney pointed out that a
"gravely disabled" person is defined as one who is unable to take care of
basic needs or is irrational due to mental illness. He also noted that the
Colorado Supreme Court had held the Care and Treatment Act must be
liberally construed because of the curtailment of personal liberty involved.
Judge Ney's opinion, reversing the trial court, stated that the future possibility of grave disability was insufficient to uphold the trial court's certification. The opinion cited California authority to the same effect.
Colorado's Care and Treatment Act had been modelled on a California
statute.
In Denver Publishing Co. v. University of Colorado,8 the court was faced
with determining the reach of Colorado's Open Records Act. The University of Colorado (CU) had terminated the employment of Galen Drake as
Chancellor. The dispute was arbitrated and a settlement agreement was
reached. Denver Publishing (the Rocky Mountain News) sought all
records regarding Drake, all contracts with Drake, all policies regarding
leave for administrators, and all contracts with other chancellors. CU refused to provide most of the information.
The trial court held that certain of the documents withheld had been
improperly classified as personnel file documents, and were, therefore,
subject to disclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Drake's
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contractual documents must yield
to the "clear intent of the Open Records Act," 9 and that the public interest
is served by disclosure.
The university argues that disclosure, contrary to the expectation of parties, of the terms of the settlement of a controversy
may chill its future ability to resolve internal matters of dispute,
thus effectuating a substantial'injury to the public interest. While
such an effect is possible, the public's right to know how public
funds are expended is paramount considering the public policy
of the Open Records Act.' 0
Christy v. Ibarra1 1 presented questions of statutory construction of federal statutes. Plaintiffs brought the action to compel the State's Home
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
1992).

778 P.2d 300 (Colo. CL App. 1989)
812 P.2d 682 (Colo. CL App. 1990)
Id. at 685.
Id.
826 P.2d 361 (Colo. Ct App. 1991) cert. denied 1992 Colo. Lexis 232 (Colo. Mar.
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Based Care System under Medicaid to provide benefits to them. There
was no dispute that plaintiff; were eligible in fact; however, they lived in
counties which had no agency to provide the individual needs assessment
required as a prerequisite to receiving care. The Department of Social
Services contended that it was "in effect" in compliance with the federal
Medicaid statute that requires that a state plan for medical assistance
"shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the state," even though no
services are provided in certain parts of the state, because there are procedures and requirements established for certification of management agencies throughout the state. The state argued it had no further obligation.
The appeals court noted that the state could fill the gap services provision'when counties do not provide services. It also found that, under the
existing system, a recipient might lose services simply by moving from one
county a few miles to another county. "We conclude," the court held,
"that this results in a plan to provide medical assistance which is not 'in
effect' statewide," 12 contrary to federal regulations. Judge Ney noted that
remedial legislation such as the Social Security Act is to be liberally construed. However, the court also held that only uniformity was required,
not an increase in the level of services afforded eligible recipients already
receiving services or those who would benefit from the court's ruling.
The court also reversed the trial court's dismissal of parallel claims under
other portions of the Medicaid statute.
3. Commercial Disputes
In MineralDeposits Ltd. v. Zigan,13 the court was faced with defining
the reach of trade secrets and unjust enrichment law compared to the proexploitation of knowledge and technology policies underlying patent law.
There, Mineral had developed a spiral concentrator, a device for recovering gold particles from sand and gravel. It was patented in Australia.
Zigan contacted Mineral's sales representative and said he was interested
in purchasing up to 200 machines, and the representative agreed to lend
Zigan the machine for Zigan to test its efficiency. Zigan removed the patent label, and gave the machine to another person who took the machine
apart and then proceeded to make copies. Mineral demanded damages in
the amount of profits it would have made had it sold the number of machines defendants used or sold to others (170). Had the device been patented in the U.S., a patent infringement suit presumably would have been
brought.
Judge Ney ruled that a trade secret does not lose its character simply
because it is offered for public sale. Here, the device was lent for testing
for possible sale; not for duplication and possible re-sale. Thus, the court
affirmed the finding of liability for misappropriation of a trade secret.
The court applied the principles of the Restatement of Torts, sec. 757 to
this situation. The damages award also was affirmed. A finding of fraud as
12. Id. at 364.
13. 773 P.2d 606 (Cola. Ct. App. 1988).
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to defendants other than Zigan was reversed, due to the lack of misrepresentations by them.
In Denver West Metro. Dis. v. Geudner,14 a metropolitan district had condemned a right of way over land owned by Geudner. The trial court determined that the condemnation action was brought in bad faith because
there was no public necessity for condemnation-rather the land was being sought to facilitate the sale of property owned by relatives of the controlling district's board members. The court noted that the board
members' disclosure of an interest did not limit the court's review of the
"bad faith" character of the condemnation. The court also held that an
incidental public benefit does not control a finding that the essential purpose is or is not a public benefit. The appeals court affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that the essential purpose was to assist another landowner in concluding a commercial transaction and thereby advance the
private interests of the District's officers. Based on substantial evidence
supporting that conclusion, the trial court's ruling was affirmed. 15
4.

Family Law

In the case of In re the Marriageof Bookout,16 the court faced the difficult issue of determining whether in a divorce proceeding involving a professional practice, maintenance based on the value of the practice may be
awarded in addition to the division of property based on the capitalization
of earnings involved. The husband in Bookout was a physical therapist who
had established a practice with ten employees. The wife had recently become employed as an interior designer at a very modest salary. The trial
court ordered the husband to pay over to the wife substantial sums, based
on a marital estate over half of which was represented by the husband's
practice. Noting the wife's living needs were substantially greater than her
income and that payments from the husband's practice would be deferred, the trial court also ordered the husband to pay maintenance and
child support to the wife. The husband argued this amounted to a double
recovery, and also attacked the trial court's findings of valuation of the
practice, based on the wife's expert's testimony.
Judge Ney first rejected the attack on the expert testimony for wife
and the trial court's reliance thereon. Then, he turned to the critical issue. He noted that goodwill of a professional practice is an asset acquired
during the marriage. Maintenance and child support, in contrast, are
based upon a prospective difference between the two persons in earning
power. Goodwill supplements the earning power of a business or practice
and is not the earning capacity itself, he ruled. Judge Criswell specially
concurred, suggesting that a deduction must be applied to husband's income for that maintenance attributable to the share of goodwill husband
had been required to transfer to the wife.
14. 786 P.2d 434 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
15. Id. at 437.
16. 833 P.2d 800 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).

1993]

PETER NEY

45

All of the foregoing decisions pay careful attention to the trial court
record and reasoning. They display a faithfulness to United States and
Colorado Supreme Court decisions as binding precedent. The decisions
also present a reasoned articulation of principles underlying a sound application or distinction of those precedents. They display attentiveness to
the importance of each lawsuit to the individual or governmental entity
involved. None of these cases has been reviewed or reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court. Peter Ney is a judge's judge, in whose hands the
most difficult cases may be put for fair and principled decision-making.

